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ABSTRACT
 
: 
 
G. E. Morton tries to defend libertarianism against my claim that it
relies on an implausible secularization of ideas of divine sovereignty. But it is not
true, as he claims, that morality itself entails human sovereignty: witness the moral
theories of divine-command theorists and philosophical consequentialists. Nor is it
true that sovereignty can be conceptually transferred from God to equal human
individuals, since they would have no legitimate way to legislate over each other,
short of a unanimous “general will.” Nor, finally, does the idea of first possession
rescue private property rights, since it is as applicable to animals and children as to
adult human beings.
 
In my paper “Libertarian Natural Rights” (Van Duffel 
 
2004
 
a), I argued
that neither freedom as nonconstraint of options, nor freedom to do what
one wants, is a plausible basis for libertarian natural-rights claims. Instead,
I proposed the notion of natural dominion as a more promising basis for
libertarianism. However, I argued, the ascription of natural dominion (or
sovereignty) to people fails to provide reasons for them to respect each
other’s sovereignty. A theory that takes natural dominion as its basis can
therefore justify only a Hobbesian state of nature. A libertarian theory
that relies (implicitly or explicitly) on the idea that people are natural
sovereigns, but also claims that people have duties to respect each other’s
property, must be incoherent.
 
Siegfried Van Duffel, svduffel@gmail.com, is a post-doctoral fellow in the Department of
Philosophy, National University of Singapore.
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G. E. Morton states two objections. The first objection is that my thesis
does not undermine libertarianism because, contrary to what I suggested,
property rights, as libertarians understand them, are not rooted in 
 
domin-
ium
 
 but in first possession. The second objection is a sort of 
 
reductio ad
absurdum
 
 of my claim that conceiving of people as natural sovereigns does
not allow us to infer that they have obligations to respect each other’s
sovereignty. My claim, Morton says, calls into question the whole moral
enterprise. If my claim goes through, it “is not libertarian natural rights
that are incoherent, but morality itself.”
Let me address the second objection first. According to Morton, “the
thrust of describing someone as a ‘sovereign’ is to establish, at least in
large part, that he or she is a moral agent,” because moral agency is usually
considered to be a matter of individual sovereignty. If “sovereignty”
indeed equals “moral agency,” my argument would presumably show
that no moral agent can promulgate or enforce moral laws (at least not
laws that bind other moral agents). But, says Morton, “if Kant and most
other moral theorists are right, then morality is precisely those universal
rules by which moral agents bind themselves and all other agents.”
For the sake of argument, I will divide Morton’s argument here into
two parts: (
 
1
 
) “Moral agency” is equivalent to “sovereignty”; thus, we
cannot possibly conceive of ourselves as moral agents unless we acknowl-
edge that we are sovereign beings.
 
1
 
 (
 
2
 
) If we believe moral rules to have
existence, we must also hold that moral agents have the normative power
to legislate moral rules, because these rules can be brought into existence
only by the agents who mutually bind themselves by them.
 
The Non-Obviousness of Kantianism
 
The view expressed in Morton’s first claim is clearly wrong. Our
common-sense conception of moral agency does not imply that we
conceive of ourselves as sovereign beings. To appreciate this, consider a
community in which everyone believes that moral rules are laid down by
God. Certainly these people consider each other to be moral agents.
They all have the ability to obey (or disobey) moral rules. They hold each
other responsible for failures to behave morally, etc. None of these
people, however, are moral agents in the sense in which Morton defines
moral agency—i.e., in terms of the ability to promulgate moral obliga-
tions. These people do not consider themselves to be the authors of any
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moral law. Even if we imagine Kant to be claiming that these people are
simply mistaken about the origin of the moral law (such that, contrary to
what they believe, they have promulgated the law themselves), we
cannot infer from this that the conception that these people have of each
other fails as a conception of moral agency.
Similarly, like these religious people, most of us do not believe that the
only moral rules that we obey are rules that we have brought into exist-
ence ourselves. Most of the duties that we imagine ourselves as having—
duties to be honest, to respect each other, not to steal, not to hurt each
other, etc.—did not come into existence because we decided to adopt
them. They were there all along, even before anyone ever imagined that
they were. Consider the right of women to equal treatment: if you
believe that women have such a right, like most of us nowadays do, then
you certainly also believe that women had this moral right long before
anyone imagined that they had it, even if such a right had never been
thought of.
 
2
 
 Or, if you are a libertarian, you will not agree that the
supposed morality of taxing people depends on whether anyone has
rejected the idea in moral terms. Even in an imaginary age when nobody
thought taxation was wrong, libertarians will say, it was nonetheless
wrong (people merely didn’t realize that it was). In this sense, not even
libertarians believe that moral rules are legislated.
Morton’s second claim can be interpreted to the effect that most moral
theorists subscribe to moral constructivism. Whatever the appeal of moral
constructivism as a position may be, it is certainly not true that most moral
theorists subscribe to it. Not just divine-command or ideal-spectator
theorists, but most consequentialists (utilitarians and others), as well as
many adherents of deontological moral theories, would not consider
themselves to be moral constructivists.
Yet even if we would grant that most moral theorists subscribed to
constructivism, this would not contradict my claim that if human beings
are all equally sovereign, they could not have obligations to respect each
other’s sovereignty. The reason is that a constructivist could not possibly
hold individual human beings to be sovereigns in the relevant sense. A
sovereign exercises normative control over a certain domain: she is the
author of the laws that apply in that domain. But if moral laws derive from
a sovereign, how can equally sovereign human beings be that sovereign—
and thus be the author of moral rules that bind all other human beings?
The ability to bind all other human beings would imply either that all
other human beings are part of this sovereign’s domain, or that together
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they constitute a kind of “general will” that is capable of binding them
all. But this, I submit, precludes the individuals themselves from being
sovereign.
 
Kant—or Rousseau?
 
Morton thinks that there is nothing in the concept that precludes sover-
eignty from being distributed over multiple agents, but there certainly is,
at least if this distribution is supposed to leave the sovereignty of the
individuals intact. The problem is that the decisions of a sovereign must
have normative consequences. But unless the agents that constitute a
collective sovereign are always in agreement, there will be cases in which
the will of an individual fails to be normatively effective.
Another way to see the problem is this: Imagine a state of nature in
which hitherto no moral rules existed, and human beings are supposed to
decide which moral rules to establish. Should these people disagree on
which moral rules to adopt, how are they to arrive at moral rules at all?
If certain people think taxation is wrong, but most other people think
otherwise, how are they to arrive at a decision?
A libertarian may want to take recourse in the idea that no one may
be forced into compliance with a rule that he or she hasn’t agreed to. But
if moral rules are promulgated by a sovereign (who, in this case, is not
any individual, but is a community of beings that together constitute a
sovereign on another level), such a move is unavailable. For in the
absence of a decision by the community of people that constitute the
sovereign, no rule that one of these people propose has any moral stand-
ing. The problem is that there will be no moral standards 
 
at all
 
 until
everyone has come to an agreement. Put more generally, the point is that
the rules that determine the correct decision procedure are also moral
rules, and certainly these cannot all be dependent on any decision of any
human being or group of human beings.
Of course, this analysis seems to fly in the face of Kant’s claim that the
idea of the will of every rational being as a universally legislating will is
the supreme principle of morality—that all rational beings are sovereigns
in the kingdom of ends. Kant indeed held that the moral law is legislated
by a rational will, and that we are bound only to those laws that we have
given. But Kant was also committed to moral objectivity. He thought
moral requirements not only universally valid, but also in some sense
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necessary.
 
3
 
 Thus, Patrick Kain (
 
2004
 
) has recently shown that Kant,
contrary to what other interpreters have thought, did not endorse a
constructivist conception of morality. Kant distinguished between legis-
lating a law and being the author of a law. “No one, not even God,”
according to Kant, “is the author of moral laws, since they do not spring
from the will, but are practically necessary.”
 
4
 
 The reason for Kant’s
insistence on the independence of the moral law from any author is that
the notion of authorship threatened the categorical necessity of our moral
obligations. In other words, instead of endorsing a constructivist concep-
tion of morality, Kant thought that a law that has an author, whether
divine or human, could not possibly be a moral law that could ground
moral obligations.
 
First Possession Does Not Confer Property Rights
 
I take it that no further argument is needed to show that my critique of
the basis of libertarian natural rights does not undermine the possibility of
morality per se, and that this objection therefore is unfounded. Let me
now address Morton’s other objection: the claim that because I have
mischaracterized the basis of (libertarian) natural rights, my criticism at
best fells a straw man, not libertarianism.
Surprisingly, this claim is not so much argued for as merely posited.
Morton ignores my arguments to the effect that the notion of natural
dominion does a better job than the notion of freedom in explaining the
implicit distinctions that are drawn in arguments for libertarian rights.
Instead he proposes another basis for natural rights (first possession),
without caring to explain why this notion would better accommodate
intuitions underlying libertarian natural-rights theories than does the
notion of natural dominion. I do not think such an explanation could be
given, since the notion of first possession is so obviously defective that it
cannot possibly ground any serious theory of natural rights.
The notion of natural dominion is closely associated with the notion
of free will, and this explains why people have thought that only human
beings can own something: like God, human beings have free will (at
least on some accounts). But first possession, conceived (to quote
Morton) as a “historical relationship” between possessor and thing, does
not share this quality. Why can’t a horse take possession of the meadow
on which it was the first to graze, or a fox of the hole in which it is the
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first to live? These pieces of land confer benefit on the animals that first
use them as much as they may benefit human beings. Similarly, most
libertarians would not grant full property rights to small children, but first
possession would seem to entail that a child’s possession of something
results in a natural property right, as it supposedly does when the
possessor is an adult human being.
Even for an adult human being, simply having been somewhere, or
having held something, does not suffice to appropriate something.
Otherwise the first discoverers would have acquired all the till-then
unowned lands that they passed through. One has to “take possession” of
something, i.e., one has to form an intention to appropriate it and some-
how make this intention public. This shows that possession, as a historical
relationship, is not a sufficient basis for the establishment of a property
right.
 
5
 
Acknowledging the notion of dominion as the basis of libertarian
thinking also makes it possible to understand why only the interference
of other human beings is seen by libertarians as an intrusion on a person’s
freedom (or an encroachment on her rights). Since only other human
beings can follow norms, the law of a sovereign can apply only to other
human beings. “First possession” is unhelpful in this respect, too. If I am
wronged when I am deprived of a good that I possessed first and want to
hold on to, then a storm that deprives me of the roof over my house
wrongs me. Similarly some acts, while they do not deprive anyone of a
good, may nevertheless be considered as infringements of a right.
Suppose that you own a forest in which a rare mushroom grows, that you
are very fond of this mushroom, and therefore that you forbid anyone to
walk in the forest, because you are afraid that someone might destroy it.
However, I am an environmentalist who from time to time sneaks into
the forest because I know this mushroom needs some protection. By
entering the forest, I am violating a specific order of yours (because I
failed to convince you that the mushroom needs protection). By protect-
ing the mushroom, I am actually protecting your interest in its continued
existence, but I am nevertheless violating your property right. When we
acknowledge that such rights are based in dominion, we can see why this
is the case. We can also see in what sense libertarian natural rights are
different from rights that protect interests—since the protection of inter-
ests could easily justify, say, paternalistic infringements upon libertarian
property rights, if this would achieve the protection of the property hold-
ers’ interests.
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The notion of first possession is also liable to an objection similar to
the one that Nozick formulated against the Lockean labor theory of
property mentioned by Morton. If I am the first to arrive on an island,
do I possess the whole island, or merely the parts of it on which I have
walked? Invoking the criterion of interest, or “benefit,” does not help,
because it gives rise to the objection that something can be possessed only
on condition that it confers a benefit on its possessor, and perhaps also as
long as it continues to do so. But the more important problem with
introducing the notion of benefit in a historical argument of the sort that
Morton is trying to defend is that it would seem incumbent on such a
theory to claim that something did not confer any benefit on anyone else
before it was appropriated for the first time. As anyone familiar with early
discussions of property rights will realize, this claim relies for its plausibil-
ity on a collapse of the distinction between use and property. Some
people have argued (unsuccessfully, I think) that such a distinction cannot
be maintained in respect of consumables, but even if we would grant this,
it is certainly possible to distinguish between mere use and ownership in
respect to land.
 
6
 
 Once you allow for this distinction, it becomes impos-
sible to claim, as Morton does, that any appropriation of something
previously unowned wrongs no one because the good benefited no one.
Moreover, the fact that something is commonly available for use could
in itself be considered a benefit for those that may have access to it in the
future, as long as it is not individually appropriated by someone else. So
even if the first person to use the thing is not, at the moment of appro-
priation, inhibiting its use by someone else (because no one is using the
thing right now), excluding others from any future use does deprive them
from a benefit that they otherwise might have had.
 
7
 
Thus, I am not convinced by the claim that my paper has misrepre-
sented the basis of libertarian natural rights. Morton has certainly not
given any compelling arguments to show that it has. Morton’s alternative,
on the other hand, is arguably even more problematic as a basis for natural
rights than the different notions of freedom that I considered in my paper.
 
NOTES
 
1
 
. Morton’s claims are irritatingly imprecise. On the one hand, he sometimes
suggests that sovereigns are a subclass of moral agents: “If a ‘sovereign’ is merely
a moral agent to whom a certain realm of autonomy attaches. . . .” On the other
hand, he writes as if moral agents are sovereign because they necessarily bind each
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other and themselves by universal rules. His argument, however, seems to require
the latter claim.
 
2
 
. This may sound overconfident, as some relativist will deny this to be the case. For
a defense, see Van Duffel 
 
2004
 
b.
 
3
 
. See Reath 
 
1994
 
 for an attempt to reduce the tension between the two.
 
4
 
. Kant, “Moralphilosophie Collins,” quoted in Kain 
 
2004
 
, 
 
276
 
. The distinction
between legislator and author is made in the 
 
Metaphysik der Sitten
 
 (
 
6.227
 
). See also
Kain 
 
2004
 
, 
 
266
 
.
 
5
 
. Morton doesn’t seem to argue this, since he explicitly says that something has to
ennoble one’s possession of something before we can say that it is wrong to take
it from her. But the argument already presupposes property rights, since it relies
on an implicit distinction between a good that is in somebody’s possession, and
other goods that are not (see below).
 
6
 
. For an excellent discussion, see Kilcullen 
 
2000
 
; see also Mäkinen 
 
2001
 
 and 
 
2003
 
and Dawson 
 
1983
 
.
 
7
 
. My apologies to the reader to whom these arguments sound all too familiar, but
some libertarians seem to have a strange resistance to them.
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